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INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO. V. OUELLETTE: UNEASY
RESOLUTION OF WHICH STATE'S LAW TO APPLY
IN INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION
DISPUTES
INTRODUCTION

Until 1972, no Supreme Court decision specifically had ruled on the
issue of what law to apply in interstate water pollution disputes. In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee ("Milwaukee I'), 1 the Court held that the spe-2
cialized federal common law of nuisance applied in these actions.
However, the Court handed down that opinion six months before Congress amended the Clean Water Act ("CWA" or "Act").3 When the related City of Milwaukee v. Illinois ("Milwaukee IF') 4 case came before
the Supreme Court in 1981, the Court opined that Congress' 1972
amendments to the CWA had preempted the application of federal common law in such suits.' The question of whether injured parties still had
a cause of action under state law was not decided. 6 Six years later, in
InternationalPaperCo. v. Ouellette,7 the Supreme Court ultimately held
that when pursuant to the CWA a court asserts jurisdiction over a state
law claim regarding interstate water pollution, the source State's law
controls.'
InternationalPaper further consolidated a difficult area of the law
which, before the Milwaukee II ruling, had apparently found some uniformity in the application of the federal common law of nuisance. However, despite the majority's decision in Milwaukee II, three justices
dissented from the Court's holding that Congress intended to preempt
federal common law in this area.9
1. 406 U.S. 91 (1972). In that case, Illinois filed a motion for leave to file a bill of
complaint against, among others, the city of Milwaukee, seeking to abate alleged pollution of Lake Michigan. See id. at 93.
2. See id at 107. The Supreme Court refused to exercise its original jurisdiction
over the case because a district court's "powers are adequate to resolve the issues." Id
at 108.
3. See Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1971) (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C.§§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). The Clean Water Act, also
called the Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("CWA" or "Act"), was adopted in 1948
and amended several times. See R. ZENER, GUIDE TO FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW 59-60 n. 1 (1981). The 1972 Amendments represented a total rewriting of the Act.
See id.
4. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).

5. Id. at 317-19.
6. Id. at 310 n.4.
7. 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
8. Id. at 487.
9. See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 332 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by
Justices Stevens and Marshall); see also R. Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private
Legal Remedies for Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 121, 163-67 (1985), (discussing why it
is unlikely that Congress intended to preempt application of federal common law in inter-

state water pollution suits.)
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This Note analyzes the current state of the law in determining interstate water pollution disputes. Part I discusses the history of this area of
the law. Part II examines the present case, InternationalPaper Co. v.
Ouellette, especially in light of the action taken on the Milwaukee cases.
Part III concludes by considering the Supreme Court's majority and dissenting opinions, proposing that despite reservations by certain jurists
and commentators, the CWA does indicate that in state law claims pertaining to interstate water pollution the source State's law applies in disputes subject to the CWA.
I.

THE LAW OF INTERSTATE WATER DISPUTES

The development of the federal common law of nuisance as applied to
interstate pollution disputes can be traced back to the early 1900's, starting with the Supreme Court decisions handed down in Missouri v. Illinois, 10 a case involving interstate water pollution," and Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., 2 a case involving interstate air pollution.' 3 These
cases required consideration of three major concerns of the Court: first,
preserving the balance of power between the Supreme Court and state
government;' 4 second, providing an arena for the peaceful resolution of
interstate suits;' 5 and third, allowing a State the opportunity to protect
10. 180 U.S. 208 (1901), 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
11. 200 U.S. 496, 517 (1906). In Missouri v. Illinois, Missouri sought injunctive relief
to stop Illinois from dumping raw sewage into a canal that emptied into the Desplaines
River, which in turn flowed into the Illinois River, which emptied into the Mississippi
River. Since Illinois law authorized the disposal of untreated sewage into the River, no
state law claim was available to Missouri. Id at 517-19. The Supreme Court carefully
considered whether to enjoin the dumping, since to do so would override the decision of
the Illinois Legislature to permit it, and also would establish a powerful new precedent in
such interstate nuisance actions. Id. at 519-20. Consequently, the Court held that it
would hear only those cases which were of an extremely serious nature. Id. at 521. In
this instance, the Court determined that not only were the allegations serious enough for
it to entertain jurisdiction, but that doing so would satisfy its concern with providing a
forum in which to settle interstate disputes peacefully. Id at 520-21.
12. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
13. 206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907). In this leading air pollution case, the State of Georgia
claimed that the Tennessee Copper Co. had emitted "noxious gas" which had caused
damage to the woods and plant-life in Georgia. Id. Despite Georgia's allegation that a
continuing public menace was a common law crime in both States, Tennessee had not
taken action against the company. Id at 231 (argument for State of Georgia). The
Supreme Court enjoined the pollution, reasoning that the States have a right to protect
their natural resources from unreasonable interference stemming from another state or its
citizens. See id. at 237.
14. See Missouri v.Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 519 (1906). ("The Constitution gives this
court original jurisdiction in cases in which a State shall be a party... Therefore, if one
State raises a controversy with another, this court must determine whether there is any
principle of law and, if any, what, on which the plaintiff can recover. But the fact that
this court must decide does not mean, of course, that it takes the place of a legislature.");
see also Note, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois: The Demise of the FederalCommon Law of
Water Pollution, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 627, 631-33 (discussing concerns of the Supreme
Court addressed in early interstate nuisance disputes).
15. See U.S. Constitution art. III, § 2, cl.1: "The judicial power shall extend to
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6
its environmental integrity.'
Missouri v. Illinois and Tennes~ee Copper Co. mark the beginning of
the application of the federal common law of nuisance to interstate pollution disputes. This trend was not interrupted by the 1938 Erie R.R. Co.
v. Tompkins '7 decision, which held that "[t]here is no federal general
common law" in diversity cases.8 On the same day that the Supreme
Court decided Erie, it stated in Hinderliderv. La Plata Co. 19 that federal
common law applied in certain areas.2 0
In 1948, Congress passed the first Federal Water Pollution Control
Act. 2' That Act was not as all-encompassing or specific as the 1972 statute and subsequent amendments enforced today.2 2 Because the Supreme
Court entertained jurisdiction over Milwaukee I before Congress had
passed the 1972 amendments, the Court was guided by the less detailed
1948 Act in unanimously holding that federal common law applies in
interstate nuisance disputes.2 3

.. controversies between two or more States .... ; see also North Dakota v. Minnesota,
263 U.S. 365, 372-73 (1923) (Jurisdiction over controversies between States "was conferred by the Constitution as a substitute for the diplomatic settlement of controversies
between sovereigns and a possible resort to force"); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 44, 85
(1938) (quoting Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 743 (1907)) ("All
the States have transferred the decision of their controversies to this court; each had a
right to demand of it the exercise of the power which they had made judicial by the
Confederation of 1781 and 1788; that we should do that which neither States nor Congress could do, settle the controversies between them."); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S.
496, 520-21 (1906), ("It may be imagined that a nuisance might be created by a State
upon a navigable river like the Danube, which would amount to a casus belli for a State
lower down, unless removed. If such a nuisance were created by a State upon the Mississippi the controversy would be resolved by the more peaceful means of this court."); and
Note, supra note 14, at 631.
16. See Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91, 101-02 (1972); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,
206 U.S. at 237-38 (1907), ("When the States by their union made the forcible abatement
of outside nuisances impossible to each, they did not thereby agree to submit to whatever
might be done.... [T]he alternative to force is a suit in this court.")(citation omitted);
and Note, supra note 12, at 631-32.
17. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
18. Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
19. 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
20. Id. at 110. In this case concerning the interpretation of a "compact" between
Colorado and New Mexico involving the use of the waters of the La Plata River, the
Supreme Court stated: "[W]hether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned
between the two States is a question of federal common law." The Court did not mention
Erie.
21. See Zener, supra note 3 at 59-60.
22. See id.
23. 406 U.S. at 104. The Court denied Illinois' "motion to file a bill of complaint"
under the Court's original jurisdiction, but ruled that Illinois could maintain an action in
federal district court. Id. at 108. The State then filed suit in Illinois federal district court,
alleging that the city was liable for creating a public nuisance under both federal and
Illinois common law. In addition, the complaint alleged a violation of the State Environmental Protection Act. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee II1), 731 F.2d 403,
404, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985).
In his article, In Praise of Erie- And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 383, 421 (1964), Judge Friendly classified the techniques used to create specialized
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In Milwaukee I, the Supreme Court declined to exercise original jurisdiction, despite its recognition of the existence of a potential federal common law claim for abatement of a nuisance caused by interstate water
pollution.24 Nine years later, the case came back to the Court on appeal.2" Notwithstanding that a number of cases had been decided according to the dictates of Milwaukee ,26 the Supreme Court majority in
Milwaukee II overruled the earlier decision, determining that the 1972
CWA, enacted just six months after the Court had reached its earlier
decision, preempted such application."
This change in direction of the development of interstate water pollution law was reaffirmed in another 1981 Supreme Court decision, Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers
Association,2" a case involving alleged violations of the CWA and the
federal common law as: (1) spontaneous generation in situations where critical federal
policies are overriding; (2) the implication of "a private federal cause of action from a
statute providing other sanctions"; (3) [the construction of] "a jurisdictional grant as a
command to fashion federal law"; and (4) "the normal judicial filling of statutory interstices." The Supreme Court used a combination of these techniques in deciding that the
federal common law of nuisance applied in Milwaukee L First, the Court concluded that
because of the many statutes that Congress had passed in order to preserve the Nation's
waters, environmental protection was an important national policy. Consequently, the
Supreme Court spontaneously generated federal common law in this area of important
public policy. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91, 101-03 (1972).
Secondly, the Court determined that the remedies provided by Congress were not the
only federal remedies available, stating that "it is not uncommon for federal courts to
fashion federal law where federal rights are concerned." Id. at 103 (quoting Textile
Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957)). Thus, the use of federal common
law filled the gaps of the federal water pollution statutes.
The Court also found support for this use of the federal common law in Missouri v.
Illinois and Tennessee Copper Co. (evidently the Court was not concerned that these cases
were decided before Erie), finding that States should not be subjected to pollution from
exterior sources, and that when they are so exposed, they should have a peaceful arena in
which to resolve such disputes. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91, 104-05 (1972). Finally, the
Supreme Court discussed the benefit of having a uniform standard in interstate nuisance
disputes. Id at 107 n.9.
However, the Court noted that future action by Congress to regulate water pollution
might preempt federal common law as well. Id at 107. In addition, this judgment effectively overruled part of a Supreme Court decision handed down less than one year earlier,
which indicated that state common law would control a claim such as Illinois'. See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 327 n.19 (1981) (Milwaukee I overruled Ohio v. Wyandotte
Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971)).
24. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91, 106-08 (1972).
25. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
26. See Glicksman, supra note 9, at 153, n.158.
27. See 451 U.S. at 317-19; see also Note, supra note 14 at 53-57. In Milwaukee II,
the Court quoted from the Legislative History in which the Congress had recognized that
the 1948 "Federal water pollution control program... has been inadequate in every vital
aspect." S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. 10, reprintedin 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3668, 3758. The Court stated that in enacting the amendments, Congress
intended to establish an all-encompassing program of water pollution control, and the
Court made extensive references to the Congressional Reports in determining that this
statute had replaced the application of federal common law in interstate water disputes.
See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1981).
28. 453 U.S. 1 (1980).
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Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA) of 1972.29
In a decision with two Justices dissenting, the Supreme Court held that
neither Act implies a private right of action independent of its citizen suit
provisions, and reemphasized that the federal common law of nuisance
had been preempted in the area of water pollution by the CWA.3 °
Thus, with the exception of the citizen suit provisions, Milwaukee II
and NationalSea Clammers have eliminated all opportunities for private
persons to seek damages under federal law for injuries caused by activities regulated under the CWA.3
Justices Blackmun and Stevens strongly dissented in both decisions,
and were joined by Justice Marshall in Milwaukee 11 in asserting that
"federal common law displacement rests ... on a faulty assumption." 32
Justice Blackmun wrote that the original reasons for applying the federal
common law of nuisance in interstate water pollution cases were dispositive.33 Furthermore, Justice Blackmun stated that it "should not be taken
as presumptive evidence, let alone conclusive proof" that Congress intended to preempt previous approaches to controlling interstate water
pollution merely because in 1972 Congress again addressed the complex
issue of purifying the nation's waters.34 Justice Blackmun also stated
that as the organization designated by Congress to regulate the CWA, the
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)," "continued reliance on federal common law is firmly grounded in the language and structure of the
language, [and] 36I fail to see how the Court can so lightly disregard its

interpretation.

In National Sea Clammers, Justice Blackmun joined with Justice Stevens in asserting that the majority's appraisal of the intent expressed by
Congress in the CWA and the MPRSA with respect to thefederal common law was wrong. Justice Stevens also reaffirmed Justice Blackmun's dissent in Milwaukee 11.38
Thus, the Justices' views on the federal common law of nuisance and
interstate water pollution are far from uniform. InternationalPaper is
29. See id. at 4. In that case, the National Sea Clammers Association, an organization of fishermen and clamdiggers who harvested off the coasts of New York and New
Jersey, brought suit in federal district court against various governmental entities and
officials from New York, New Jersey, and the federal government, claiming damage to
fishing grounds caused by ocean dumping of sewage and other waste. See id. at 4-5. The
Association sought injunctive and declaratory relief and compensatory and punitive damages under both the federal common law of nuisance, the CWA and the MPRSA, 33
U.S.C.§§ 1401 et seq. (1982)
30. 453 U.S. at 15-22.
31. See Glicksman, supra note 9, at 121.
32. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 333 (1981).
33. Id. at 347.
34. Id. at 342.
35. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (1982).
36. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 347.
37. National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1, 22 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by
Justice Blackmun).
38. See id. at 31.
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the latest Supreme Court case in which the majority of the Court continues to refine its interpretation of how the CWA regulates interstate water
disputes.
II.

INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO. V. OUELLETTE

The holding reached by a bare majority in InternationalPaper elucidates the Supreme Court's interpretation of how the CWA balances the
right of an affected State to protect its environment from pollution
caused outside the jurisdiction, against a source State's right to regulate
its pollution in light of other policy interests. The Court already had
determined in Milwaukee II that the CWA reserved to the States the
right to use their laws, provided that they did not set standards less stringent than those established under the CWA.3 9 But the remaining question which the Court finally determined in InternationalPaperwas which
State's law to apply. Upon close examination of the statute and legislative history, the majority held that when a court considers a state law
claim concerning interstate water pollution which is subject to the CWA,
the court must apply the law of the source State.'
A.

FactualBackground

Lake Champlain forms a natural partial boundary between the States
of Vermont and New York. In 1978, property owners on the Vermont
side filed a class action against the International Paper Company
(IPC)."1 They alleged that the discharge of effluents into the lake from
an IPC pulp and paper plant operating on the New York shore made the
water "foul, unhealthy, smelly and.., unfit for recreational use", which
in turn diminished the value of the Vermont land, and brought an action
for a "continuing nuisance" under Vermont state law.4 2
IPC moved for dismissal for failure to state a cause of action pursuant
to Rule 12(c) and Rule 56(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
claiming that the CWA preempted the property owners' state law action.
The parties agreed that the court should defer judgment on this motion
until the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had ruled on a similar
case involving interstate
water pollution, Illinois v. City of Milwaukee
43
("Milwaukee IIp1).
39. See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 327-29.
40. See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 487 (1987).
41. Id. at 484. Although originally filed in Vermont State Superior Court, the action
subsequently was removed to Federal District Court for the District of Vermont. Id.
42. Id. In addition to seeking injunctive relief requiring IPC to modify its water
treatment system, the owners sought compensatory damages and punitive damages. Id.
43. 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985).
In the Milwaukee I decision, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), after ruling that the specialized federal common law of nuisance applied in interstate water pollution disputes, the Supreme
Court declined to exercise jurisdiction, because a lower court action was available, and
remanded the case. See id. at 107-08.
When the case again came before the Supreme Court nine years later as Milwaukee II,

1989]

INTERSTATE WA TER POLLUTION

The Seventh Circuit remanded Milwaukee III for dismissal of Illinois'
claim, holding that the CWA did not allow one State to apply its law
against a pollution source found in another State." The court reasoned
that applying a different State's laws to a single "point source' 45 would
disrupt the "carefully devised" regulatory system established by the
CWA.46 In addition, the court held that the only suits not preempted by
the Act were those claiming violations of the polluting State's laws.4
The Vermont District Court hearing InternationalPaper, however,
disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's decision and deniedthe motion to
dismiss. 41 While the court acknowledged that federal law usually governs interstate water pollution disputes, it also determined that Sections
510 and 505(e) of the 1972 CWA Amendments (collectively known as
"the saving clause") expressly preserve state law rights of action.49
In holding that the saving clause established that federal law does not
totally preclude individual States' rights to control pollution, the district
court examined three possible interpretations to determine what kind of
state actions Congress did intend to preserve.5 0 The first interpretation
views the saving clause as preserving state law only as it applies to waters
which are outside of the CWA's jurisdiction. 5 However, since the Act
applies to practically all of the nation's surface waters,52 the court re451 U.S. 304 (1981), the Court overruled its previous decision, due to the enactment of
the CWA, and again remanded the case. See id. at 317-32.
Ultimately, as Milwaukee III, the case came before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that a source State's law applies in interstate water disputes. See Milwaukee I1, 731 F.2d 403, 414 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985).
44. See 731 F.2d at 413-14.
45. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1982), which defines "point source" as "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or may be

discharged."
46. See 731 F.2d at 414.
47. See id. at 413-14.
48. Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264 (D. Vt. 1985), aff'd, 776
F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1985), rev'd in part, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
49. Id. at 268-69. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 510, 86 Stat. 816, 893
(1971)(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1982)) states:
"Except as expressly provided... nothing in this chapter shall... be construed
as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States
with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such States."
Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 505(e), 86 Stat. 816, 889 (1971) (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1982)) states that:
"Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of
persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of
any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief... "
50. Ouellette, 602 F. Supp. 264, 268, aff'd, 776 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1985), rev'd in part,
479 U.S. 481 (1987). For a discussion of the three interpretations of the saving clause, see
Note, 1982 Wis. L. REv.at 664-71.
51. See Ouellette, 602 F. Supp. at 268.
52. Although the CWA purports to regulate just "navigable waters," this term has
been interpreted broadly to include waters that are not navigable in the traditional sense.
See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133-35 (1985); Clean
Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 502(7), 86 Stat. 816, 886 (1971) (codified as amended at
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1982)) (defining navigable waters as "waters of the United States").
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jected this extremely narrow view. 53
The second interpretation sees the saving clause as preserving state
nuisance law in the State where the discharge is located. 4 While the
Seventh Circuit followed this reasoning in Milwaukee III," the Vermont
District Court rejected it, stating that "there is simply nothing in the Act
which suggests that Congress intended to impose such limitations on the
'
use of state law." 56
Instead, the District Court followed the third and most expansive interpretation: that the State affected by another State's discharge may apply its own nuisance law to determine the appropriate remedy. The
court concluded that this method of resolving interstate water pollution
disputes would not conflict with the objectives of the CWA because the
States' "imposition of compensatory damage awards and other equitable
relief for injuries caused... merely supplement the standards and limitations imposed by the Act."5 8
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of
the Vermont District Court, 9 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to resolve the 'split between the Circuits on this aspect of federal
preemption. 60
In a 5 to 4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of IPC's
motion to dismiss, but reversed the District Court's decision that Vermont law applied.6 1 The Court essentially agreed with the rationale
adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Milwaukee II.'6 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court held that the source State's law must be applied when a
court considers a state law claim concerning interstate water pollution
which is subject to the CWA.6 3
B.

Rationale of the Supreme Court

In reaching its decision in InternationalPaper,the Supreme Court reaffirmed the proposition that a federal statute need not explicitly establish that particular state laws are supplanted."M While courts should not
quickly decide that state law is preempted,65 when a federal statute is
"sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Con53. Ouellette, 602 F. Supp. at 269.
54. Id at 268.
55. See 731 F.2d at 714.
56. Ouellette, 602 F. Supp. 264, 269, aff'd, 776 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1985), rev'd in part,
479 U.S. 481 (1987).
57. See id.
58. Id at 271 (emphasis in original).
59. 776 F.2d 55, 56 (1985) (per curiam).
60. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
61. See id at 487.
62. See id at 492-94.
63. See id at 487.
64. See id at 491; see also Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories,
Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985).
65. See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491 & n. 11 (1987).
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gress 'left no room' for supplementary state regulation," preemption may
be presumed.6 6 Besides express or implied preemption, a state law is void
to the extent that it "actually conflicts with a ...federal statute."67 This
conflict arises when the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment or execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."68
The Supreme Court looked to the goals and policies of the CWA and
observed that while the ultimate objective of the CWA is to eliminate
water pollution, other concerns, such as state policies, must be considered in its application.6 9 Since the elimination of water pollution "cannot
be achieved immediately, and.., cannot be realized without incurring
costs,"7 ° the Court reasoned that the intent of Congress was to establish
a system in the CWA to regulate the7discharge of pollutants while accommodating legitimate state interests. '
Accordingly, the Court stated that an important aspect of the CWA is
the requirement that usually a point source must obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 72 permit from the EPA
before it may release any effluents into a navigable body of water. 3 Each
permit contains specific pollution limitations and a compliance schedule
for satisfying such provisions.74
The Court also noted the CWA's acknowledgment of the critical role
every State should play in assuring its own environmental integrity.75
The Federal Government may allow a State to oversee the NPDES program regarding point sources situated within the State, provided the
EPA Administrator finds that such proposed state program observes the
CWA's requirements.76 Whether its permit program is regulated by
66. Hilsborough County, 471 U.S. at 713 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); See InternationalPaper, 479 U.S. at 491.
67. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978); See InternationalPaper,
479 U.S. at 491; Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 713.
68. Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 713 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
67 (1941)); see InternationalPaper, 479 U.S. at 491-92.
69. See InternationalPaper, 479 U.S. at 494-95.
70. See id. at 494.
71. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 301, 86 Stat. 816, 844, (1971) (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982)). See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 43,
reprintedin 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3668, 3710 ("The committee emphasizes that this section is not to be construed as reducing any water quality effluent
state law"). See generally EPA v. California ex reL
requirements imposed as a result of ...
State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200, 205-08 (1976) (describing NPDES
system). For a detailed description of this system see Zener, Guide to FederalEnvironmental Law at 61-88.
72. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
73. See International Paper v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 489 (1987); see also Clean
Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 402(a), 86 Stat. 816, 880 (1971) (codified as amended at
33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a) (1982).
74. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
75. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 101(b), 86 Stat. 816, 816 (1971) (codified
as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1982)).
76. See InternationalPaper,479 U.S. at 489.
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either federal or state administration,7 7 a source State may require more
strict discharge limitations than those specified by the federal government. 78 In addition, the source State must provide the administrator
with a certificate that the intended discharge is in accord with the State's
water quality-based and technology-based criteria, before receiving an
NPDES permit from the Federal Government.7 9
While source States play a significant part in regulating their own pollution, the CWA provides a much smaller role for affected States sharing
interstate waterways with the source State."8 Although it might be
harmed by pollution originating outside its borders, an affected State
only has an advisory role in regulating such discharges.8" Before a federal permit may be issued, every affected State receives notice and the
opportunity to oppose the proposed standards at a public hearing. 2
Likewise, before a source State may issue a permit, it must give notice to
potentially affected States, and consider their objections and
recommendations.3
However, the Court declared that "an affected State does not have the
authority to block the issuance of the permit if it is dissatisfied with the
proposed standards. An affected State's only recourse is to apply to the
EPA Administrator, who then has the discretion to disapprove the permit if he concludes that the discharges will have an undue impact on
interstate waters."" No affected State may establish a separate permit
system to control an out-of-state source. 5 Thus, the majority determined that source States are intended to play a greater role in the federal
regulatory program than affected States. 6
The Supreme Court then declared that the CWA applies to all point
sources and essentially all bodies of water, and since it sets forth the
77. Id. at 490.
78. See 40 CFR § 122.1(f) (1987).
79. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 401(a), 86 Stat. 816, 877 (1971) (codified
as amended at 33 U.S.C. 1341(a)(1) (1982)).
80. See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 490 (1987).
81. Id.
82. Id.; see also Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 401(a)(2), 86 Stat. 816, 878
(1971) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1982)); and Milwaukee III, 731
F.2d at 412.
83. See Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 402(b)(3),(4),(5), 86 Stat. 816, 881
(1971) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3),(4),(5) (1982)).
84. InternationalPaper, 479 U.S. at 490-91; see also Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No.
92-500, § 402(b)(6), 86 Stat. 816, 881 (1971) (codified. as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(b)(6).(1982)).
85. See Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 402(b), 86 Stat. 816, 880-81
(1971)(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1982)) (state may establish permit
system for waters "within its jurisdiction" (emphasis added)); Lake Erie Alliance for Protection of Coastal Corridor v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 526 F. Supp. 1063,
1074-75 (W.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 707 F.2d 1392 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915
(1983); Tennessee v Champion Int'l Corp., 709 S.W.2d 569 (S.Ct. Tenn. 1986), cert.
granted, 479 U.S. 1061 (1987).
86. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S 481, 491 (1987).
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procedures for obtaining a permit as well as its own remedies,"' "it is
clear that the only state suits that remain available are those specifically
preserved by the Act.""8
In deciding this way, the Court relied upon two 1987 amendments,
Section 505(e), s9 which says that "[n]othing in this section shall affect an
injured party's right to seek relief under state law", 9' and Section 510,91
which preserves a State's authority "with respect to the waters (including
boundary waters) of such State." 92 The Court based its interpretation of
the statute on the "language [of the statute which] arguably limits the
effect of the clause to discharges flowing directly into a State's own waters, i.e. discharges from within the State."9 3 The Court further reasoned
that the application of an affected State's nuisance law to a point source
in another State would effectively override the EPA's permit requirepolicy choices made by source States in adopting their
ments and the 94
own standards.
In addition, the Court stated that to subject a source State to regulation by affected States would make for a confusing system, since there
might be a number of affected States along an interstate waterway, and if
they all had different standards, the source State could be liable for nuisance in one affected State but not another.95
The Supreme Court concluded by holding that although the Vermont
property owners should not bring claims under Vermont nuisance law,
they could bring an action under New York nuisance law.96 Application
of the source State's law would neither upset the balance among federal,
affected-state and source-state interests, nor subject a source to an indeterminate amount of potential regulations.9 7 Finally, the Court held that
the case could be heard in Vermont, since "the Act preempts laws, not
courts."9' "In the absence of statutory authority to the contrary, 99 the
87. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 402(b)(7), 86 Stat. 816, 881 (1971) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(7) (1982)).
88. InternationalPaper,479 U.S. at 492.
89. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 505(e), 86 Stat. 816, 889 (1971) (codified
as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1982)).

90. Id.

91. See Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 510, 86 Stat. 816, 893 (1971) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1982)).
92. Id.
93. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 493 (1987) (emphasis added).
Conversely, the statute "arguably" could be interpreted as applying to discharges from
outside the State's waters, which would mean that the affected state's law would apply
against an out-of-state polluter. Thus, an important foundation of the Court's rationale
rests on the ambiguous word "arguably."
94. See InternationalPaper, 479 U.S. at 495.
95. Id. at 496-97.
96. Id. at 497-98.
97. Id. at 498-99.
98. Id. at 499-500.
99. Cf Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 505(c)(1), 86 Stat. 816, 889 (1971)
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(1) (1982)) (citizen suit to enforce permit
must be brought in judicial district where source is located).
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rule is settled that a district court sitting in diversity is competent to
apply the law of a foreign State.'"o°
C. Dissenting Opinions
Despite the unanimous opinion that the CWA does not preempt a private nuisance suit filed in an affected State's court when the source of the
alleged injury is located in another State, 10 four Justices dissented from
the Court's view that an affected State's court must apply the source
State's nuisance law. 102
In Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, he argued that since Vermont
and New York private nuisance law are the same, and Vermont is the
only State to share Lake Champlain with New York, there was no need
to make a choice of law determination. 0 3 Justice Brennan then asserted
that even if the question of applicable state law had arisen, nothing in the
CWA preempts the usual two-step analysis undertaken by federal district
courts to determine which State's law to apply in interstate tort actions."°4 Thus, he concluded that the CWA's "plain language clearly indicates that Congress wanted to leave intact the traditional right of the
affected State to apply its own tort law when its residents are injured by
an out-of-state pollutor."' °5
In Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion, he averred that since the parties
to the action had not asked the District Court to decide which substantive law would govern, the Supreme Court should not hand down an
advisory opinion determining that the District Court must apply the substantive law of the State in which the source of water pollution is located."°6 In conclusion, Justice Stevens stated: "One cannot help but
wonder what has happened to the once respected doctrine of judicial restraint. Just as this Court does not sit to edit the opinions of lower
courts,... it also does not sit to draft
advisory opinions for the possible
10 7
future guidance of other courts."'
III.

ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION

International Paper, as the most recent of Milwaukee II's Supreme
Court progeny, stands for the proposition that the source State's law is
controlling in interstate water pollution disputes.' 0 8 Yet the close ruling
in this case indicates the concern of some of the Justices with the direc100. International Paper v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 500 (1987).
101. See id. at 500, 509.
102. See id. at 500 (Brennan, J., joined by Blackmun and Marshall, JJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); see also id at 508, (Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part).
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 501.
See id at 501-02 & n.1.
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 504 (1987).
Id. at 509-10.
Id.
Id. at 487.
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tion in which the Court's determination in Milwaukee II is headed. For
example, Justice Brennan, who had voted with the Milwaukee II majority that the CWA precludes application of the federal common law of
nuisance in interstate water disputes, °9 dissented in InternationalPaper.' 0 He argued that nothing in the CWA requires application of the
source State's law in such instances, and the majority's ruling upset traditional state tort law principles.1
Justices Blackmun, Marshall and Stevens, on the other hand, questioned whether the CWA really does preempt application of the federal
common law of nuisance in interstate water disputes.II 2 Thus, further
examination of the Act, and of excerpts from the Congressional hearings
held during its formulation, might shed more light on Congress' intent
regarding these areas.
In Milwaukee II, the Supreme Court held that the CWA precluded
application of federal common law in this specific area.' 13 As its foundation, the Court observed that preemption of federal common law by a
federal statute is premised on the doctrine of the separation of powers,
and "it is for Congress, not federal courts, to articulate the appropriate
standards to be applied as a matter of federal law."' " 4
The Supreme Court then determined that the CWA extended federal
statutory control to all point source discharges, and Congress had intended to address comprehensively the issue of water pollution control
through this statute.'
The Court held that these amendments did not
constitute just another statute merely "touching interstate waters"' 16,
and thus were inadequate to preempt federal common law." 7 To the
contrary, these amendments constituted a "total restructuring" and
"complete rewriting" of the water pollution legislation existing at the
time that Milwaukee I was before the Supreme Court. "8 The Court added that the language in its 1975 Train v. City of New York decision "was
obviously correct when it described the 1972 Amendments as establishing 'a comprehensive program for controlling and abating water
pollution.'

"' '9

The Court further supported its interpretation in noting the inclusion
of all point sources within the purview of the statute. 20 A mandatory
109. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 317-19 (1981).

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 500-08 (1987).
Id at 500-04.
See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 332-333 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 332.
Id at 317.
See id. at 317-18.

116. Milwaukee I, 451 U.S. 304, 317-18.

117. Id.
118. Id at 317. The Court referred to the statements of a number of Congressmen in
supporting its contention that these views on the comprehensive nature of the legislation

were practically universal. Id.at 319.
119. Id at 318 (quoting Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 37 (1975)).
120. See id.at 318.
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permit is necessary for a point source discharge to be legal, "which directly subjects the discharger to the administrative apparatus established
by Congress to achieve its goals."' 1 Compliance with this specific procedure would promote the elements of "efficiency and predictability"' 2 2
that are critical to attaining the express Congressional goal which, at the
time of the 1972 amendments, was to eliminate water pollution by
1985.123

For instance, efficiency (or uniformity) would be facilitated since once
a discharger obtains a permit, his responsibilities24and liabilities are settled
and he can plan his business more accurately.
Predictability (or finality) of approach would never be achieved so long
as each State 12 could set up its own discharge standards.'

26

However,

since some flexibility in maximum state effluent limitations is politically
desirable, and provided such standards were at least as strict as the minimum federal standards, 27 this system provides the most uniform way to
attain it (absent federal common law), due to the uniformity in procedure
and remedies.128
Finally, in Milwaukee II the Supreme Court refuted arguments that
the saving clause expressed a Congressional intent to preserve federal
common law remedies. 129 The Court explained that although Section
510 of the 1972 amendments permits States to adopt stricter effluent limitations than those adopted under the CWA, that provision does not mean
that States can establish more stringent limitations through federal
courts by using federal common law.' 3° Moreover, the saving clause
means only that nothing in the citizen suit section itself shall affect a
person's rights "under any statute or common law" to3 seek enforcement
of limitations or standards, or to seek "other relief".1 '
121. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 318 (1981).
122. See 479 U.S. at 496; see also Note, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois The Demise of the
Federal Common Law of Water Pollution. 1982 Wis. L. REv. at 664 n.281.
123. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 101, 86 Stat. 816, 816 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1982)).
124. See Note, 1982 Wis. L. REv. at 666.
125. "The term '[s]tate' means a State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands." Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 502(3), 86 Star. 816, 886
(1971) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(3) (1982)).
126. See Note, 1982 Wis. L. Rv. at 666.
127. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 510, (1971) (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. § 1370 (1982)).
128. See Note, 1982 Wis. L. REv. at 667. The majority further supported its decision
that the CWA has preempted federal common law in the area of interstate water pollution by referring to language in Milwaukee I, where the Court had said that "new federal
laws and new federal regulations may in time preempt the field of federal common law of
nuisance." Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972). In Milwaukee II, evidently, the Court
decided that the CWA satisfied the criteria for doing so. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304,
317-19 (1981).
129. See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 320.
130. See id. at 328.
131. Id. at 328.
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In sum, the majority determined that the saving clause has no effect
beyond Section 1365, and the rest of the CWA can preempt federal common law remedies. 132 Thus, the Court held that the CWA supplanted
application of the federal common law of nuisance in water pollution
suits. 133

In dissent, Justice Blackmun stated that the CWA did not preempt use
of federal common law in such disputes. 134 Calling the majority's reading of the statute "extremely strained" and "at odds with the manifest
intent of Congress to permit more stringent remedies under both federal
and state [common law],"' 135 Justice Blackmun's dissent viewed the
Court's ruling as an unjustified "license to supplant all legal remedies
outside the Act itself...136
The dissent also discussed the "disturbing aspect" of the Court's elimination of federal common law application in interstate water pollution
suits.137 Rather than promoting a more uniform federal approach to this
issue, Justice Blackmun felt that the majority's ruling "will lead States to
turn to their own courts for statutory or common law assistance in filling
the interstices of the federal statute."' 13 Therefore, the majority's preemption ruling, based partly on its view of the CWA as "comprehensive,"' 39 and its belief that water pollution control is particularly
unsuited to a "sporadic, .... ad hoc" federal common law approach 1'4 suggests the possibility of fifty different state
law standards instead of one
141
uniform federal common law standard.
The CWA does not expressly state that use of the federal common law
of nuisance is preempted in interstate water disputes. 142 Nevertheless,
one can argue that the fact that Congress has not amended the CWA so
as to neutralize the Supreme Court's interpretation in Milwaukee II, in
the relatively substantial period of approximately eight years since the
Court so ruled, would indicate at the least Congressional ratification of
such an interpretation, even if Congress did not intend initially for the
CWA to be so construed. This argument is particularly persuasive in
light of the recent focus on the environment, and with the overwhelming
passage, over President Reagan's veto, of the 1986 Amendments. 14 3 Had
Congress wanted to establish that the CWA was intended to preempt the
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 305.
See id. at 317-19.
See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 332-54 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 342. But see Milwaukee I, 451 U.S. at 329 n.22.
Id. at 342.
Id at 353.
Id. at 353-54.
Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 318 (1981).
Id. at 325.
But see id. at 315 n.8.
See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 493 (1987).
Congress overrode the Presidential Veto with a vote of 86 to 14 in the Senate, 133
CONG. REc. S.1708 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1987) and a vote of 401 to 26 in the House, 133
CONG. REC. H.525-26 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1987).
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federal common law of nuisance in the area of interstate water pollution,
this would have been an appropriate time statutorily to so state.
Since the Supreme Court had not received any Congressional indication that the majority had ruled incorrectly in Milwaukee II, in International Paper the Court held that: the Act establishes the application of a
source State's law in interstate water disputes not covered by the
CWA.I" That ruling advances the objectives of predictability and efficiency,' 4 5 for while 56 different sets of effluent standards could be applied
in such actions,'" at least when to apply which standard now is definite.
This interpretation of Congressional intent concerning interstate water
pollution suits makes sense when balancing Congress' aim to restore and
maintain the natural chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters against assuring a State's economic well-being by not
imposing extreme environmental restrictions on industrial plants and the
like.' 4 7 This is a political concern which the Supreme Court noted is
more properly overseen by Congress.' 4 8 By establishing minimum federal standards and a procedure to eliminate water pollution, the CWA
allows each State to follow national regulations as well as to set its own
policy priorities.
Production plants tend to employ a relatively large amount of people,
and the injunctive relief respondents sought in InternationalPaperwould
have, at the least, caused reconstruction of the mill, resulting in, at best,
the temporary lay-off of workers. Shutting down the mill for any length
of time would have produced a detrimental effect on the community's
economy, and courts have been reluctant to enforce injunctions in such
instances. 49
At first glance, it might seem that since the historic police powers of

the States include maintaining their own environmental integrity, an affected State should be able to halt the influx of effluents from outside.
144.
145.
146.
97.
147.

See InternationalPaper, 479 U.S. at 493-97.
Id at 496.
See Note, 1982 Wis. L. REv. at 667; see also InternationalPaper,479 U.S. at 496See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494-95 (1987); Clean

Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 302(a)(b), 86 Stat. 816, 846 (codified as amended at 33

U.S.C. § 1312(a)(b)-(1),(2) (1982)).
148. InternationalPaper,479 U.S. at 497.
149. For example, similar to the paper mill in InternationalPaper, defendant's cement
plant in the intrastate case Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d
870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970), was a large employer, tax-payer and industry in the town.
The New York Court of Appeals denied the injunction, although it allowed the one-time
action for permanent damages. Id. at 228, 257 N.E.2d at 875, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
In addition, before the federal Supreme Court handed down its decision in InternationalPaper, the Supreme Court of Tennessee followed the same reasoning as the Seventh
Circuit in Milwaukee III, and held that Tennessee could not exercise jurisdiction over a
South Carolina paper mill operating under an EPA approved permit, even though the
mill's discharges produced deleterious effects in Tennessee. Tennessee v. Champion Intermational Corp., 709 S.W.2d 569, 574-76 (S. Ct. Tenn. 1986), vacated, 479 U.S. 1061
(1987).
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However, such a State is given the opportunity to express its concerns
before a source State receives its permit."' 0 In fact, an affected State is
not exercising its policing responsibilities if it does not participate in this
procedure. Therefore, while an affected State cannot force a source State
to follow an affected State's policy dictates, it can make its views known,
and if they have sufficient merit, the EPA Administrator will not issue a
permit to the source State.'
Finally, despite the dissenters' objection to the suppression of traditional state tort law, the Supreme Court has held that since Congress can
preempt state law in any area within the scope of its power under the
52
commerce clause, it can preempt state law in the area of water control.
Thus, although the ruling in InternationalPaper greatly changes the future of state tort actions involving water pollution, the certainty which
this holding brings to a complex area of the law advances the Congressional objective of purifying the Nation's waters without undermining
the economic security of any State.' 5 3
150. See Tennessee, 709 S.W. 2d at 574-76; InternationalPaper,479 U.S. at 490-91.
151. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 401(a)(2), 86 Stat. 816, 878 (1971) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1982)).

152. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 759-66 (1982).
153. InternationalPaperundoubtedly also will have an effect on the outcome of interstate air pollution suits. Courts have noted certain differences between the CWA and the
Clean Air Act (CAA) 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. (1982). See United States v. Kin-Buc,
Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699, 701-02 (D.N.J. 1982) (holding that, even though the CAA, unlike
the CWA, does not regulate all stationary emission sources of pollutants, the CAA
preempts the federal common law of nuisance because "Congress addressed the problem
of air pollution" through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program); see
also New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 1981).
However, the major structural approaches of both statutes are comparable. For instance, each contains pollution limitations based on the cost and feasibility of control
technology, and air and water quality standards based on the impact of air and water
pollution on the quality of the ambient air and water. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410, 7411
(1982) (CAA); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313, 1314 (1982) (CWA). Moreover, the CWA and the
CAA are notably similar in a number of sections. See, e.g., publication of criteria documents, 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2), (b)(1), (d) & (f) (1982) (CAA); 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1),
(a)(2), (a)(3) & (b) (1982) (CWA); standards of performance for new resources, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7411(a) & (b) (1982) (CAA); 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a) & (b) (1982) (CWA); regulation of
hazardous or toxic pollutants, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c) (1982) (CAA); 33 U.S.C. § 1317(c)
(1982) (CWA); inspections, monitoring, and entry, 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a), (c) & (b) (1982)
(CAA); 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a), (c) & (b) (1982) (CWA); exercise of emergency power, 42
U.S.C. § 7603(a) (1982) (CAA); 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a) (1982) (CWA); citizen suits, 42
U.S.C. § 7604(a), (b), (c), (d) & (e) (1982) (CAA); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), (b), (c), (d) & (e)
(1982) (CWA); federal procurement, 42 U.S.C. § 7606 (1982) (CAA); 33 U.S.C. § 1368
(1982) (CWA); preemption, 42 U.S.C § 7416 (1982) (CAA); 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1982)
(CWA); reports to Congress, 42 U.S.C. § 7613 (1982) (CAA); 33 U.S.C. § 1375(a) (1982)
(CWA); interstate pollution abatement, 42 U.S.C. § 7426 (1982) (CAA); 33 U.S.C. § 1342
(1982) (CWA); judicial review, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(a), (bX2) & (c) (1982) (CAA); 33 U.S.C.
§ 1369(a), (b)(2) & (c) (1982) (CWA); international pollution abatement, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7415 (1982) (CAA); 33 U.S.C. § 1320(a) (1982) (CWA). Therefore, it would appear
that as InternationalPaper requires that the source State's law be applied in interstate
water suits, by analogy, the source State's law should apply in interstate air disputes.
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CONCLUSION

In sum, the Supreme Court decision in InternationalPaper has farreaching effects in the areas of both environmental and tort law. While
the dissenters were opposed to the holding that the source State's law
governs in interstate water actions not covered by the CWA, the majority's opinion made the Court's Milwaukee II ruling that the Act
preempts application of federal common law in such suits much more
coherent.
The majority's interpretation in InternationalPaper appears to follow
closely the dictates of the CWA, for not only would the goal of eliminating pollution of the Nation's waters be achieved more slowly if uncertainty existed as to which law to apply in interstate water disputes, but
other important concerns, such as economic security, would be undermined. Hence, InternationalPaper has further clarified a complex area
of the law, and has set a pattern for courts to follow in future environmental suits.
Mary E. Reiner

